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The Scope of the Means Principle1 
 
[This is an uncorrected draft of a paper forthcoming in The Journal of Moral Philosophy 
as part of a symposium on Jonathan Quong’s The Morality of Defensive Force (OUP: 




One of the central contributions of Jonathan Quong’s fascinating The Morality of Defensive Force is 
its detailed articulation and defence of the means principle, which holds that there is an especially 
stringent constraint on harmfully using persons. The means principle captures the intuitive 
difference between, for example, diverting a runaway trolley away from five people towards one, 
and pushing one person in front of a trolley to prevent it from hitting the five. While both 
actions involve killing one and saving five, the latter involves making use of the one in order to 
save the five. The means principle is thus an important aspect of the broader non-
consequentialist idea that the moral status of actions is determined not only by the value of their 
outcomes, but also the ‘mode of agency’ by which those outcomes are produced.2 
 
Quong defends the following formulation of the means principle: 
 
It is morally wrong to harm Y in the pursuit of an objective if doing so involves 
using Y’s body or other things over which Y has a rightful prior claim, unless Y 
is duty bound to suffer this harm, or has consented to this harm.3 
In order to determine when the means principle is violated, Quong’s proposes the 
following counter-factual test: 
To test whether X’s act violates the means principle, we can ask whether X’s act 
could succeed in the absence of Y and Y’s rightful property. If the answer is no, 
then X uses Y as a means.4 
Quong’s defence of the means principle is not only an independent (and valuable) contribution 
to moral theory. It also plays an important role within his broader theory of the morality of 
defensive force. According to Quong, the permission to use force in self-defence has two 
independent justifications. First, the target of harm may be liable to defensive harm in virtue of 
threatening unjust harm, and so lack their normal right against such treatment. Quong’s ‘Moral 
Status’ account of liability sets out the specific conditions for this loss of rights to take place. 
Second, and more controversially, the target may retain their usual right against harm, but that 
																																																						
1 This paper was presented at a workshop on Jonathan Quong’s The Morality of Defensive Force at Oslo University in 
December 2019. Many thanks to Lars Christie for organising the workshop and to the participants for stimulating 
discussion and to Jonathan Quong in particular for his detailed response. Special thanks to Joseph Bowen, Susanne 
Burri, Cécile Fabre, Richard Healey, and Lisa Hecht for extremely helpful written comments.   
2 This is not to say that all non-consequentialists endorse the means principle. For skepticism see e.g. Uwe Steinhoff, 
‘Wild Goose Chase: Still No Rationales for the Doctrine of Double Effect and Related Principles’, Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 13, No.1 (2019): 1-25. 
3 Jonathan Quong, The Morality of Defensive Force (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p.82. (MDF hereafter). 
4 Ibid, p.178. 
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right is overridden by the defender’s agent-relative prerogative to add additional weight to their own 
interests. This hybrid view allows Quong to shield his account of liability from the objection that 
it is implausibly restrictive: though the Moral Status account excludes some intuitively 
permissible targets of defensive harm from liability (such as ‘innocent threats’ who lack 
responsibility for posing a threat), the permissibility of using force is explained by the agent-
relative prerogative.5 However, the standard objection to agent-relative prerogatives is that they 
will be overly permissive: if one is permitted to kill the innocent in order to preserve one’s life, 
where does the carnage end? This is where the means principle comes in, as a constraint on the 
permission to engage in self-preferential harming.6 On Quong’s view, our agent-relative 
prerogatives permit us to harm others only if we do not use them as a means. Hence, Quong’s 
version of the means principle, his moral Moral Status account of liability, and his defence of 
agent-relative prerogatives all hang together.  
 
In this paper, I focus on Quong’s account of the scope of the means principle. That is, the range 
of actions over which the special constraint on using a person applies. One the key ideas 
underpinning Quong’s approach is that the means principle depends on an independent and 
morally prior account of our rights over the world and against one another.7 On this view, we 
first determine what we owe to one another as a matter of inter-personal and distributive justice. 
This account of our rights then determines the scope of the means principle: the stringent 
constraint on harmfully using persons applies only to usings which violate an independently-
grounded right. This approach to the means principle exemplifies a major theme running 
throughout The Morality of Defensive Force: that “we cannot understand the principles regulating the 
use of defensive force in isolation from wider-questions about the just distribution of rights over 
persons and property.”8 
 
In what follows I raise a series of challenges to this ‘rights-first’ approach. First, I consider 
Quong’s treatment of harmful omissions under the means principle. On Quong’s view, refraining 
from aiding a person only falls within the scope of the means principle if the subject of the 
omission has a right to be aided. I argue that this ‘rescue proviso’ generates counter-intuitive 
results: there seem to be clear cases of wrongful use in which the subject has no independent 
right to aid. 
 
Second, I use the case of harmful omissions to cast doubt on another aspect of Quong’s means 
principle. Unlike some defenders of the means principle, Quong holds that the wrong of using 
someone does not depend on the intentions or motives of the agent. It depends only on whether 
the agent’s actions satisfy an objective standard of conduct (captured in Quong’s rights-sensitive 
																																																						
5 See Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s contribution to this symposium for a discussion of Quong’s account of liability. 
6 Of course, the agent-relative prerogative is also constrained by the amount of weight that one may add to one’s 
own interests.  
7 For a similar view that the constraint on using persons “only pronounces on the moral status of various actions 
when supplemented by an independent account of the claims we have in various circumstances”, see Ketan 
Ramakrishnan, ‘Using People as Tools’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 44, No.2 (2016), 133-165, at p.157n33. However, 
since Ramakrishnan’s account of the means principle appears to make the strength of persons’ claims sensitive to 
whether satisfying those claims requires the use of other persons (see n.17 below), it is unclear to me how much 
Ramakrishnan is really committed to the independence of rights and the means principle. 
8 Quong MDF, p.7. 
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counter-factual test). I point out that there are cases of harmful omissions in which the agent’s 
intentions seem crucial to whether their act violates the constraint on using a person. 
Third, I consider Quong’s extension of the means principle to harmful uses of persons’ 
rightfully-owned property, and not just their bodies. I suggest that the relationship between the 
morality of harming and distributive justice may be more complex than Quong alleges. Instead 
of the morality of harming lying downstream from a prior account of distributive justice, the two 
normative domains interact and inform each another. My central contention is the question of 
what counts as a just allocation of property is itself sensitive to whether or not the constraint on 
harmful use applies to the use of that property. On this this alternative picture, the means 
principle partly informs a theory of distributive justice, rather than simply reflecting an independent 
theory of our distributive entitlements.  
 
2. Omissions and the Means Principle 
 
Quong’s position on the application of the means principle to omissions is developed in 
response to the following case, proposed by Ketan Ramakrishnan:  
 
Room: Five people and one other person, Archibald, are suffering from a deadly virus. 
Waldo has enough medicine to save the five or to save Archibald, but not both. For 
Archibald has an especially malicious strain of the virus, and curing him would thus 
require Waldo’s entire stock of medicine. Archibald’s legs are in the doorway to the room 
that contains the five, keeping the door ajar; if Archibald’s legs were not in the doorway, 
the five people would be inaccessible to Waldo, and Waldo would be unable to treat 
them. Waldo chooses to save the five instead of Archibald.9 
Ramakrishnan objects that Quong’s test for violations of the means principle counter-intuitively 
implies that it is impermissible for Waldo to save the five: since Waldo would not be able to save 
the five if Archibald were absent, Quong’s counter-factual test appears to classify saving the five 
as a violation of the means principle. 
 
Quong agrees that this would be an unwelcome result, but denies that it is in fact an implication 
of his view. He points out that his formulation of the means principle applies to causing harm, 
and not allowing harm to occur. Quong argues that only some omissions fall within the scope of 
the means principle: 
 
Waldo does not harm Archibald, he merely fails to save him, and thus his act is 
not prohibited by the means principle. The means principle does not prohibit 
failures to save a victim unless the victim has a right to be rescued or provided with resources. 
Thus, the means principle only prohibits Waldo’s act in Room if Archibald has a 
right to the medicine or a right to be rescued by Archibald.10 
																																																						
9 Ramakrishnan, ‘Using People as Tools’, p.146. Ramakrishnan is responding to Quong’s earlier presentation of his 
view. Jonathan Quong, ‘Killing in Self-Defense’, Ethics 119, No3 (2009): 507-537. 
10 Quong, MDF, p.194. My emphasis. 
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On Quong’s view, in order to bring a harmful omission within the scope of the means principle, 
we must establish an independent right to be aided on the part of the harmed party.11 And, by 
hypothesis, Waldo lacks a right to be rescued in the Room case. If, for example, Waldo were 
Archibald’s bodyguard and had sworn to protect him, then Waldo would violate the means 
principle by saving the five. But absent rights to be aided, omissions are not covered by the 
means principle.12 
However, while this ‘rescue proviso’ seems to allow Quong’s means principle to deal with cases 
like Room (I will revisit this assumption below), it runs into problems with other, more central, 
cases. Consider: 
Icy Trolley: In icy conditions, an out of control trolley is heading towards five innocent 
people who will be paralysed if it hits them. Sarah wants to save the five, but she cannot 
divert the trolley. However, another innocent person – Billy – has just slipped on the icy 
pavement and is uncontrollably sliding into the path of the trolley. If the trolley hits Billy, 
his body will slow the trolley and the five will be saved. But Billy will be paralysed. Sarah 
can easily reach out and stop Billy from sliding into the path of the trolley. Sarah refrains 
from saving Billy in order to bring about the saving of the five.13  
 
I assume that it is morally wrong for Sarah to fail to save Billy in this case. Moreover, the wrong 
is grounded in the fact that Billy would be used for the sake of the five. Failing to rescue Billy 
seems morally on-a-par with pushing Billy into the path of the trolley. Applying Quong’s initial 
counter-factual test, we get the intuitively correct result: If Billy were absent, Sarah could not 
succeed in saving the five. Hence, Sarah violates the means principle.  
 
However, on Quong’s view, we also need to establish that Billy has a right to be rescued in order 
to account for this judgement. Note that we cannot claim that Billy has a right to be saved because 
failing to save him would involve using him as a means. This would be circular. For Quong, the 
fact that an individual has a right to be saved is meant to explain when and why the constraint on 
using comes into effect.  
 
The problem is that it is not clear why Billy would have such a right. Excluding the fact that Billy 
will be used to save the five, the Icy Trolley case is morally equivalent to a case where Sarah must 
choose between saving one or saving five from independent threats. Consider: 
 
																																																						
11 For discussion of Quong’s account of the right to be rescued, see Lisa Hecht’s contribution to this symposium.  
12 Warren Quinn and Larry Alexander also endorse the ‘independent right’ condition on whether omissions violate 
the means principle (as well as a broadly ‘right-first’ approach to the means principle in general). Warren Quinn, 
‘Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double-Effect’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, No.4 
(1989): 334-351, at p.346; Larry Alexander, ‘the Means Principle’ in Ferzan, K.K. and Morse, S.J. (eds), Moral, Legal, 
and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael Moore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 251-264 at p.261. See 
also Niko Kolodny, ‘Political Rule and Its Discontents’ in Sobel, D., Vallentyne, P. and Wall. S (eds) Oxford Studies in 
Political Philosophy: Vol 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 35-70, at p.46. 
13 Based on a case of Victor Tadros’s. See The Ends of Harm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.122. For 
other cases of allowing-as-a-means, see Quinn, ‘Actions Intentions and Consequences’, p.236; Ramakrishnan, ‘Using 
People as Tools’. 
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Icy Trollies: Trolley A will hit five innocent persons and paralyse all five. Trolley B is also 
hurtling down a hill, where Timmy has slipped on the ice and will fall into the Trolley B’s 
path and be paralysed. Sarah can stop one trolley, but not both. Sarah refrains from 
saving Timmy in order to save the five 
 
I take it as clear that Sarah permissibly allows Timmy to be paralysed in this case. Moreover, and 
crucially for our purposes, Sarah does not permissibly infringe a right of Timmy’s to be rescued. 
Rather, Timmy has no right against Sarah that she rescue him in the first place, in virtue of the 
fact that rescuing Timmy would preclude rescuing the five. 
 
Here are two arguments for the claim that Timmy lacks a right to be rescued by Sarah in Icy 
Trollies. First, and following many theorists (including Quong), I take it as a hallmark of a 
permissible infringement of a right that the right-holder is owed compensation for being 
wronged (or some other remedial measure).14 But it seems obvious that Sarah does not owe 
Timmy any special compensation for failing to save him.  
 
Second, the differences in the conditions for permissibly harming, compared to permissibly not-
aiding, also indicate that Timmy lack a right to be aided. In cases of harming, it is intuitively 
permissible to harm one person as the lesser-evil only if it prevents significantly greater harm to 
others.15 Consider, again, the case of diverting a runaway trolley from five towards one. While it 
seems permissible to kill one to save five, it seems impermissible to kill four to save five. By 
contrast, when it comes to choices between saving a greater or smaller number of persons from 
harm, it seems permissible to save the greater number even if it is only marginally greater. For 
example, it seems clearly permissible to rescue five rather than four (or, indeed, to rescue one 
hundred rather than ninety-nine). Since another hallmark of a right is that it is resistant to 
marginal trade-offs16, this is good evidence that persons typically lack a right to be rescued when 
doing so would preclude rescuing a greater number.17  
 
These points illustrate how rights against harm operate differently to rights to be aided. Whereas 
rights against harm persist in cases where the importance of aiding a greater number justifies 
inflicting harm on an innocent person as the lesser-evil, rights to be rescued are extinguished by 
the importance of aiding a greater number of persons.  
 
Given that Timmy has no right to be rescued in Icy Trollies, it is hard to see why Billy would have 
a right to be rescued in Icy Trolley (independent of the fact that failing to rescue him would 
involve using him as a means). In each case, the interests of one are opposed by the similar 
interests of five. If the interests of the five extinguish Timmy’s right to be rescued, they should 
																																																						
14 Quong accepts this view. MDF, p.14. 
15 As Helen Frowe explains: “Lesser-evil justifications obtain when one will prevent substantially more harm than 
one causes, such that the disparity between the harm and the good overrides the deontological presumption against 
causing harm.” Helen Frowe, ‘Claim Rights, Duties and Lesser-Evil Justifications’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
89 (2015): 267–85, at p.274. 
16 Quong accepts this view. MDF, p.14. 
17 The exception being cases where the right to be rescued is grounded in e.g. a promise or special relationship 
between the rescuer and rescue, and not simply the agent-neutral value of the rescuee’s life and wellbeing. 
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do the same with respect to Billy. I can’t see a way of morally differentiating the two cases 
without appealing to the fact that Billy, but not Timmy, would be used as a means to saving the 
five. 
 
If this is correct, then we cannot extend the means principle to omissions by appealing to prior 
rights in the way that Quong claims. To differentiate Icy Trolley from Icy Trollies, we can either: (i) 
accept that there is no right to be rescued in both cases, and appeal to wrongful use directly to 
explain why failing to rescue Billy is impermissible, or (ii) appeal to the means principle directly 
to explain why Billy (and not Timmy) has a right to be rescued.18 But neither of these strategies 
are available to Quong. The case of omissions suggests, contra Quong, that the relationship 
between rights and the scope of the means principle is not unidirectional: the means principle 
doesn’t simply track a pre-existing account of our rights, it also informs the initial assignment of 
rights. 
 
This general lesson also illuminates why Quong’s strategy for dealing with cases like Room will 
not do. The reason why Archibald lacks a right to be rescued by Waldo is presumably that 
rescuing Archibald would preclude saving the five, who collectively have a stronger claim to be 
rescued. (If the five were not present, then Waldo would intuitively have a right to be rescued, 
since saving him would be costless and we have rights to easy rescue.19) But focusing on prior 
rights to rescue renders Room equivalent to cases like Icy Trolley, which are paradigm cases of 
wrongful use. In both cases, Quong’s counter-factual test for using is met (it would not be 
possible to save the five in the absence of the one) and the prior rescue-claims of the one are 
opposed by the prior rescue-claims of five. If the claims of the five extinguish Archibald’s right 
to rescue in Room, they should also extinguish Billy’s claim in Icy Trolley. So, either both cases are 
instances of wrongful use, or neither are. This shows that any solution to the Room case will have 
to focus on revising the counter-factual test, rather than the assignment of independent rights to 
rescue. In order to explain why the means principle condemns allowing Billy to be harmed, but 
not Archibald (and thereby derivatively explain why Archibald, but not Billy, lacks a right to 
rescue) we need to identify some quasi-causal difference in the relationship between the harmful 
omission to the one and the benefit to the five. This difference will have to be more fine-grained 
than counter-factual dependence.20   
 
3. Omissions and Intentions 
 
The case of harmful omissions also raises problems for another aspect of Quong’s account of 
wrongful use. One issue that divides defenders of the means principle is whether or not the 
constraint on harmfully using a person depends on the agent’s intentions or motivations. 
Proponents of a ‘subjective’ interpretation of the means principle hold that the wrong of using a 
																																																						
18 If I understand him correctly, this is Ramakrishnan’s approach to these cases: that fact that the five would be 
saved via the use of Billy’s body diminishes the strength of their claims to rescue, such that Billy’s right to rescue is 
undefeated. Ramakrishnan, ‘Using People as Tools’, pp.149-150. Alec Walen’s distinction between ‘restricting’ and 
‘non-restricting’ claims (which is extensionally similar to the means principle) also seems to build the distinction into 
the determination of what rights people have. Alec Walen, ‘Transcending the Means Principle’, Law and Philosophy 
22, No.4 (2014): 427-464. 
19 Quong accepts the existence of rights to easy rescue. MDF, p.185. 
20 For one such attempt, see Ramakrishnan, ‘Treating People as Tools’, esp. Section II. 
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person is partly grounded in the wrong of taking up an instrumentalising attitude towards one’s 
victim.21 In contrast, defenders of an ‘objective’ interpretation, such as Quong, argue that an 
agent’s mental states are irrelevant to whether their actions violate the means principle. All that 
matters is whether the agent’s actions satisfy some objective standard of conduct, such as that 
captured in Quong’s counter-factual test.22 
  
I contend that reflection on cases of harmful omissions provides some support for an intention-
based interpretation of the means principle. Consider:  
 
Costly Icy Trolley: Sarah is out walking and sees Billy slip on the pavement and start sliding 
into the path of an oncoming trolley, which will paralyse him. Sarah can easily reach out 
and grab Billy, preventing him from being hit by the trolley. However, if she does so her 
arm will be ripped off by the force. Sarah is willing to bear the cost of rescuing Billy and 
reaches towards him. However, at that moment she spots five people down the tracks, 
who will be paralysed if the trolley hits them. She refrains from rescuing Billy, in order 
that his body be hit by the trolley, thereby saving the five.  
 
I find it intuitively obvious that Sarah acts impermissibly by allowing Billy to be harmed. Just as 
in the original Icy Trolley case, Sarah wrongfully uses Billy as a means to save the five.23 But it 
seems hard to account for this judgement within Quong’s version of the means principle.  
 
One initial problem is independent of the intentions debate. This is simply another version of 
the problem discussed in the previous section: in this case, the means principle is intuitively 
violated, but it is not clear that the victim has an independent right to be rescued. Since we only 
have rights to be rescued at a reasonable cost to the rescuer, Billy presumably has no right to be 
rescued by Sarah (on the assumption that an individual is not required to sacrifice an arm to 
prevent one person from becoming paralysed). Just as rights to be rescued can be extinguished 
by the importance of saving a greater number (as in Icy Trollies), so too can they be extinguished 
by the costs to the rescuer. So if a violation of the means principle requires the presence of an 
independent right to be rescued, it’s hard to explain how Sarah acts wrongly. This again suggests 
that whether an action involves using a person as a means plays a direct role in determining the 
moral status of actions.24 
 
																																																						
21 See e.g. Tadros, Ends of Harm, Chs.6&7; Quinn, ‘Actions Intentions and Consequences’. See also, Ramakrishnan, 
‘Using People as Tools’, p.152. 
22 Quong, MDF, p.8; pp.187-189. For other proponents of the objective interpretation, see e.g. Walen, 
‘Transcending the Means Principle’ and Alec Walen ‘The Restricting Claims Principle Revisited: Grounding the 
Means Principle on the Agent-Patient Divide’, Law and Philosophy 35, No.2 (2016): 211-247; Alexander, ‘The Means 
Principle’, p.261. 
23 Quinn suggests in passing that, in cases of this kind, it is permissible to refrain from aiding, but does not give a 
concrete example. Larry Alexander also agrees that failing to carry out a supererogatory rescue cannot violate the 
means principle. I think cases like Costly Icy Trolley shows this to be very counter-intuitive. Quinn, ‘Actions Intentions 
and Consequences’, p.346; Alexander, ‘The Means Principle’, p.261. 
24 After writing this paper, I discovered that Jeff McMahan makes a very similar objection against Quinn’s 
‘independent right’ condition for violations of the Doctrine of Double Effect. Jeff McMahan, ‘Revising the 
Doctrine of Double Effect’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 11. No.2 (1994): 201-212, esp. Section III. 
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However, the main conclusion I want to draw from cases like Costly Icy Trolley is that the violation 
of the means principle seems to crucially depend on the agent’s plans and intentions. Consider a 
variation on the case, in which Sarah is aware of all the facts, but refrains from rescuing Billy 
only because she is unwilling to bear the supererogatory cost of losing her arm. In this case, I 
find it intuitive that Sarah does not act morally wrongly. But the only difference between the two 
cases is the intention with which Sarah acts: whether she allows Billy to be paralysed for the sake of 
her arm or for the sake of the five. Since Sarah’s conduct is identical in both cases, it is hard to see 
how objective versions of the means principle such as Quong’s can account for the intuitive 
difference in permissibility.25 By contrast, versions of the means principle which incorporate a 
mental-state component are well-placed to do so: When Sarah refrains from saving Billy for the 
sake of her arm, she does not incorporate Billy into her plans, nor take up an instrumentalising 
attitude towards him.26 Cases of supererogatory rescue thus speak in favour of including some 
role for intentions within the means principle.27 
 
4. Distributive Justice and the Means Principle 
 
One of the most interesting, and controversial, features of Quong’s version of the means 
principle is that it covers not only the harmful use of persons’ bodies, but also uses of persons’ 
rightfully-owned property.28 
 
Quong appeals to the following pair of cases to support this extension29: 
 
Driftwood: Albert and Betty are each at risk of drowning in the open ocean. There is a 
piece of driftwood floating nearby, but it is very small, and only one person can use it to 
remain afloat until help arrives. Albert swims more quickly than Betty, and gets to the 
driftwood first. As a result, he survives and Betty drowns.  
Life Jacket: Albert and Betty are each in the open ocean. Betty is wearing her life jacket 
(purchased with her fair share of resources). Albert, however, has no life jacket and will 
not survive without one. Albert swims over and steals Betty’s life jacket. As a result, he 
survives and Betty drowns.  
It seems intuitive that Albert acts permissibly in the first case, yet wrongly in the second (or at 
least there is clear moral asymmetry between the two cases). Quong argues out that the wrong-
making feature of the second case is that it involves the harmful use of Betty’s rightful property, 
and that the wrong is of the same type that obtains in paradigm cases of wrongful using a 
																																																						
25 For analogous points, see McMahan, ‘Revising the Doctrine of Double Effect’. 
26 Tadros, Ends of Harm, pp.153-154. 
27 Of course, this is not a conclusive argument. As Quong points out, views which make instrumentalising intentions 
necessary for violations of the means principle will also face tricky cases (MDF, pp.178-179).  
28 Quong also includes the use of the physical space a person occupies. For other proponents of a property-inclusive 
means principle, see Walen ‘Transcending the Means Principle’; Walen, ‘The Restricting Claims Principle Revisited; 
and Larry Alexander, ‘The Means Principle’. Judith Jarvis Thomson, though skeptical of the means principle, also 
holds that there is an especially stringent constraint on harmful use of a person’s property. ‘The Trolley Problem’, 
Yale Law Journal 94 (1985): 1395-1415, at pp.1409-1412. 
29 Quong, MDF, pp.181-182. See also, pp.3-15, pp.183-187; pp.207-208 
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person’s body (such as pushing someone in front of a trolley to save others).   
Quong’s extension of the means principle to property is perhaps the clearest example of his 
general view that “we cannot understand the principles regulating the use of defensive force in 
isolation from wider-questions about the just distribution of rights over persons and property.”30. 
Importantly, Quong does not just think that the morality of defensive harm and distributive 
justice are part of the same unified normative domain, he also holds that distributive justice has a 
certain kind of priority over principles of defensive harm. As Quong puts it: 
 
[T]he common purpose of [defensive] acts is to defend people’s rightful 
entitlements – they enable people to defend what is rightfully theirs as determined 
by the appropriate principles of social or distributive justice.31 
 
Principles of distributive justice allocate to each person rights to control a fair 
share of the world. The special prohibition against harmfully using a person’s body 
or property is a reflection of this more general idea.32 
 
On Quong’s general picture, the morality of defensive harm is downstream from a prior account 
of our rightful entitlements over the world.33 Principles of social and distributive justice come 
first, and the morality of defensive harm (and the constraint on using persons in particular) 
comes later. On this view, the means principle itself has no distributive implications. It simply 
reflects whatever the correct theory of distributive justice and property rights happens to be. 
 
4.1 Counter-Intuitive Implications 
 
Extending the means principle to property has implications that strike many as implausible. One 
kind of example is prominent in the literature: 
 
Trolley Tool: A trolley is heading towards five innocent people who will be killed if it hits 
them. Bystander can divert the trolley onto a side-track where Barry is standing. 
Diverting the trolley requires the use of Barry’s wrench, which is lying nearby.34 
 
According to Quong’s version of the means principle, it is impermissible for bystander to divert 
the trolley in this case, since it would not be possible to save the five in the absence of Barry’s 
rightful property. For Quong, using Barry’s wrench to divert the trolley towards Barry is morally-
on-a-par with pushing Barry in front of the trolley in order to prevent it from hitting the five. 
																																																						
30 Ibid., p.7 
31 Ibid., p.7. 
32 Ibid., p.207 
33 Walen seems to endorse a similar general view. ‘The Restricting Claims Principle Revisited’, at pp.234 & 240. 
34 This kind of case is discussed in Thomson, ‘The Trolley Problem’, p.1411; Walen, ‘Transcending the Means 
Principle’, p.455; S. Matthew Liao and Christian Barry, ‘A Critique of Some Recent Victim-Centered Theories of 
Non-Consequentialism’, Law and Philosophy 39, No.3 (2020): 503-526, at pp.523-524; Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.62; F.M. Kamm, ‘Harming Some to Save Others’, Philosophical Studies 57, 
No.3 (1989): 227-260, at. pp.229-230. 
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Even some defenders of extending the means principle to property find this counter-intuitive, 
and attempt to qualify the kinds of property over which the means principle applies.35 
 
Quong, however, appears unmoved and concludes that we should accept this verdict in this kind 
of case.36 Below I will offer some more theoretical considerations against Quong’s extension of 
the means principle to property, but first let me point out an even more striking implication of 
Quong’s view. Consider: 
 
Three-Track Trolley: A trolley is heading towards fifteen innocent people who will be killed 
if it hits them. The track has two side-tracks. Bystander can either lethally divert the 
trolley towards innocent Barry who is standing on the first side-track (Option 1), or 
towards three innocent people standing on the second side-track (Option 2). Diverting 
towards Barry requires the use of Barry’s wrench, which is lying nearby. Diverting 
towards the three innocent people requires the use of an unowned tree branch. 
On Quong’s view, Option 1 is morally equivalent to pushing Barry in front of the trolley to save 
the fifteen and is therefore impermissible.37 Now consider Option 2. Since (by hypothesis) it is 
permissible to kill one person as a side-effect of saving five (as per the standard trolley case), it is 
presumably also permissible to kill three as a side-effect of saving fifteen. So, in virtue of Barry’s 
property right in his wrench, the only permissible way for Bystander to save the fifteen is to 
divert the trolley towards three innocent persons rather than one.38  
 
Whereas cases like Trolley Tool illustrate how a property-inclusive means principle sometimes 
requires agents (counter-intuitively) to refrain from killing (and thereby allow a greater number of 
persons to die), Three-Track Trolley shows there are cases in which property rights permit agents 
to kill a significantly greater number of persons in order to save lives, compared to a property-
exclusive means principle.39 This seems far more counter-intuitive. 
 
4.2 The Relationship Between the Means Principle and Distributive Justice 
 
Putting aside intuitions about particular cases, I want to focus on Quong’s more general picture 
of the relationship between the morality of harm and principles of distributive justice. One 
interesting issue, which Quong himself raises, is what we should say about the morality of harm 
(and the means principle in particular) in situations where the conditions of distributive justice 
																																																						
35 Walen, ‘Transcending the Means Principle’, p.455. 
36 Based on conversations with Quong and MDF, pp.191-193. 
37 Recall that according to Quong’s formulation of the means principle, it would only be permissible to lethally use 
Barry as a means to save the fifteen if Barry is duty-bound to suffer this cost for the sake of the fifteen (or if he had 
consent to being used). I assume we are not required to sacrifice our lives for the sake of saving fifteen lives.  
38 The only options I can see for Quong to resist this implication is to argue either: (i) that Option 1 becomes 
permissible conditional on the presence of Option 2 or (ii) that Option 2 becomes impermissible conditional on the 
presence of Option 1 (i.e. Bystander is required to allow the fifteen to die). But I can’t see any plausible rationale for 
either move.  
39 More strongly, if agents are (at least sometimes) required to act on lesser-evil justifications for harming, then 
Quong’s means principle entails that property rights entail that agents are sometimes required to kill a larger number 
of innocent people in order to prevent harm to others. For a defence of the requirement to act on lesser-evil 
justifications, see Helen Frowe, ‘Lesser-Evil Justifications for Harming: Why We’re Required to Turn the Trolley’, 
Philosophical Quarterly 68, No.272 (2018): 460-480. 
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are not met (which likely includes all real-world societies).40 This will require a novel theory of 
property rights under background injustice. But I want to consider a more fundamental 
challenge, which holds even under ideal conditions. The challenge addresses Quong’s picture of 
distributive justice as morally prior to principles of permissible harm. Rather than conceiving of 
the morality of harm as downstream from a theory of our just entitlements over the world, my 
suggestion is that the morality of harm (the means principle in particular) may itself play a role in 
determining the correct principles of distributive justice.41 On this view, there is a bidirectional 
relationship between the morality of harm imposition and distributive justice, in contrast to the 
unidirectional model which Quong endorses.  
 
What exactly is the difference between the unidirectional and bidirectional views? And what 
exactly needs to be shown in order to support the bidirectional view? Here is a test to help make 
the idea more precise. Imagine two worlds, which are identical except for one difference in their 
moral systems. In World A, the means principle covers the use of persons’ bodies only. In World 
B, the means principle covers both the use of person’s bodies and their property (in the manner 
defended by Quong). Apply the following test: Is there some distribution of property rights 
which would be morally acceptable in World A, but not in World B? If we answer ‘no’, then this 
supports Quong’s unidirectional view. But if the answer is ‘yes’, then this would show that the 
unidirectional view is false: an affirmative answer reveals that what counts as ones ‘fair share of 
the world’ itself depends on the implications of that distributive system for the morality of harm. 
If so, we cannot straightforwardly derive conclusions about permissible harm from a prior and 
independent theory of our distributive entitlements. 
  
I contend that we should answer this test in the affirmative. The argument has two parts. The 
first simply posits (what I take to be) a fairly widely-accepted general view about the justification 
of a system of property rights and distributive entitlements (one which I think Quong would be 
sympathetic to). On this approach, we evaluate a system by considering the extent to which it 
serves important interests (defined broadly) and reflects various values, as well the various 
complaints that may be raised against such a system. We then do the same for alternative 
possible systems of property rights and distributive entitlements. Lastly, we appeal to some more 
general moral theory to determine whether the balance of benefits and complaints justifies that 
particular system, compared to some alternative.42  
 
To illustrate the idea: Consider a property system which grants individuals strong rights to 
exclude others from previously-unowned objects via acts of acquisition. Such a right may be 
valuable for several reasons (it serves our autonomy, enables us to meet our needs, incentivises 
productive use, etc.). But it also seems subject to legitimate complaints. Most obviously, those 
																																																						
40 Quong, MDF, p.13. 
41 Larry Alexander also suggests that the means principle has distributive implications. ‘The Means Principle’ (see, in 
particular, section VIII of the SSRN version of this paper, available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2378608). My argument differs in that it does not rely on 
connecting the means principle to self-ownership, as Alexander does. On the view I propose, reflection on the 
means principle gives rise to a distinctively egalitarian distributive concern.  
42 For a helpful discussion, see Leif Wenar, ‘Original Acquisition of Private Property’, Mind 107, No.428 (1997): 799-
820 at pp.801-802. This approach obviously excludes strong libertarian or historical entitlement views, since it offers 
a broadly instrumental justification of property rights. 
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who are constrained by others’ property rights may be unable to meet their important needs.43 
Given this objectionable feature of the system, justifying the system may require the strong right 
to appropriate be qualified in various ways.44 By contrast, in a world in which the objectionable 
feature was absent (if, for example, we could meet our basic needs without the use of external 
objects, or if the means of meeting our needs fell like manna from heaven), the stronger right 
might be justified.  
 
The second, more substantive, part of the argument holds that a moral system in which property 
is included within the scope of the means principle (World B) would be subject to additional 
legitimate complaints, compared to an otherwise-identical system in which the means principle is 
restricted to the use of person’s bodies (World A). In virtue of these additional objectionable 
features, the former property system (but not the latter) requires revision in order to be all-
things-considered justified. Hence, the inclusion of property within the means principle itself 
informs and shapes our rights to control parts of the world.  
 
I contend that a moral system which includes a property-inclusive means principle would be 
objectionable in (at least) two important respects, relative to a system governed by a property-
exclusive means principle.  
 
First, such a system would involve an additional objectionable degree of unilateralism.  The basic 
idea is that under a property-inclusive means principle, our property acquisitions would impose a 
particular kind of externality or cost on others. The appeal to externalities is common in debates 
about the justification and limits of property rights. As mentioned above, any system which 
contains strong rights of acquisition threatens to set back the interests of those who are, to use 
Waldron’s phrase, “acquisitively handicapped.”45 But, in addition, a system of property rights 
may be objectionable in virtue of its purely normative externalities, independent of its effects on 
the satisfaction of others’ material interests. For example, under a moral system that includes 
property rights, each property owner is enabled to unilaterally change the normative situation of 
others at will. Most obviously, by acquiring a previously unowned object, an individual thereby 
imposes stringent duties on other persons (without their consent) not to use that object.46 
 
Of course, we might wonder how morally troubling these sorts of externalities really are. After 
all, by purchasing a bar of chocolate, I thereby unilaterally alter the normative situation of every 
person on earth. But it doesn’t seem obvious that these alterations generate any serious 
complaints. My claim, however, is that a property-inclusive means principle introduces an 
																																																						
43 This is not to say that every act of acquisition places the same kind of burdens on the property-less. Some acts of 
acquisition may only be possible for certain agents and impossible for others. In such cases, one agent’s acquisition 
does not deprive others of the opportunity to use the object. (Of course, the property-less might nonetheless have a 
legitimate claim that the property-holder share the value of the property.) 
44 See Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 265-277. Quong 
takes a similar view: our right to control parts of the world are limited by a duty to rescue others at reasonable cost. 
MDF, p.185. 
45 Waldron, The Right to Private Property, p.277. 
46 On this issue, see Bas van der Vossen, ‘Imposing Duties and Original Appropriation, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 23, No.1 (2015): 64-85; Hugh Breakey. ‘Without Consent: Principles of Justified Acquisition and Duty-
Imposing Powers’, The Philosophical Quarterly 59, No.207 (2009): 618-640. See Lisa Hecht’s contribution to this 
symposium for an application of this worry to Quong’s account of the duty to rescue. 
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additional and distinctive normative externality into a property system. The key idea is that a 
moral system governed by a property-inclusive means principle gives individuals an 
objectionable degree of influence over others’ moral protections.47 This type of externality is 
most clearly illustrated by the Trolley Tool and Three-Track Trolley examples discussed earlier. 
Consider Three-Track Trolley. Under a system where property falls within the scope of the means 
principle, Barry’s acquisition of an item of property (his tool) makes it the case that the killing of 
three innocent persons is morally justified (or even required) as the lesser-evil, rather than the 
killing of one person (Barry). Under such as system, property acquisitions serve to increase the 
property-holder’s moral protection against harm, but correspondingly decrease the comparative 
moral protection enjoyed by others (one’s property acquisitions significantly affect the 
permissibility of third-parties harming others rather than oneself).48 I contend that a moral system 
governed by a property-inclusive means principle would be subject to legitimate complaints for 
this reason. Note that this objection need not be grounded in a concern for what would actually 
happen to individuals (in terms of their likelihood of being harmed or saved from harm) under a 
property-inclusive means principle, relative to a property-exclusive means principle. Rather, the 
guiding thought is a concern for the moral status that we would enjoy under the two systems. As 
non-consequentialists such as Frances Kamm, Thomas Nagel, and Warren Quinn have argued, 
we care not only about what is done to us, but what it is permissible to do to us (i.e. the nature of 
the moral constraints on doing things to us).49 In the same vein, my suggestion is that we have a 
similar non-instrumental interest in the range of factors to which the constraints on harming us 
are sensitive. To the extent that others are able to control the shape of the constraints on 
harming us (and saving us), our moral status is less secure than under a moral system where 
others lack this ability.  
 
This kind of externality is particularly striking on Quong’s account of the normative upshots of 
our rights to control the world. In articulating his rationale for the means principle, Quong 
writes: 
 
Assume that some part of the world, P, rightfully belongs to B according to the 
correct principles of distributive justice. To make use of P without B’s consent is 
to appropriate some of B’s fair share of control over the world, and is wrong for 
that reason. The fact that P would be useful to achieve some goal, G, simply cannot serve as a 
reason to use P without B’s consent. The very purpose of having rights to control a fair share of 
the world is to block this fact from serving as a reason. To allow P’s usefulness to serve as 
a reason to use P without B’s consent is to give up on the idea that each person 
has a sphere of independence where her decisions are sovereign.50 
																																																						
47 On this point, see Thomas Nagel, ‘Personal Rights and Public Space’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 24, No.2 (1995), 
83-107; Frances Kamm, ‘Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End in Itself, and the Significance of Status’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 21, No.4 (1992), 354-389. 
48 Walen also appeals to the idea of moral externalities in constructing his ‘restricting claims principle’, though with a 
different purpose to mine. See Walen ‘The Restricting Claims Principle Revisited’, p.215 
49 Thomas Nagel, ‘Personal Rights and Public Space’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 24, No.2 (1995), 83-107; Frances 
Kamm, ‘Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End in Itself, and the Significance of Status’, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 21, No.4 (1992), 354-389; Warren Quinn, ‘Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing 
and Allowing’, The Philosophical Review 98, No.3 (1989): 287-312. 




On Quong’s view, then, our legitimate property acquisitions have impressive moral power. An 
acquisition not only renders it impermissible to achieve morally important goals (such as saving 
many lives), but extinguishes the reason-giving force of those goals. The fact that my property 
acquisitions have the normative upshot that saving your life fails to be reason-giving (in certain 
circumstances) strikes me as a non-trivial externality, which will need to be taken into 
consideration when justifying a property system that makes this externality possible. This kind of 
externality seems particularly objectionable on a view, such as Quong’s, which gives a central role 
to the ideal of persons as fundamentally independent. 
 
The second objection to a moral system governed by a property-inclusive means principle builds 
on the first. It holds that the ability to influence others’ moral protections is additionally morally 
objectionable if that system also permits some degree of distributive inequality (as most plausible 
theories of distributive justice do). Put simply, it is one thing if persons have equal opportunities 
to unilaterally increase their moral protections relative to others via property acquisitions, but 
quite another if some persons have this ability while others do not (or not to the same degree). 
More specifically, a moral system governed by a property-inclusive means principle would, under 
conditions of distributive inequality, introduce an additional form of hierarchy among persons, 
whereby (i) more-propertied individuals would enjoy stronger comparative moral protections 
against harm than less-propertied individuals, and (ii) the moral protections enjoyed by the less-
propertied would be (however unintentionally) at the mercy of the wills of the more-propertied.51 
On this picture, World B would be subject to a sui generis egalitarian complaint, absent in World 
A, despite both worlds containing identical distributions of property. 
 
This complaint is distinct from the diverse range of objections to inequality already identified in 
the egalitarian literature.52 Given that the problematic feature of World B lies in its hierarchical 
structure, it is natural to think of the egalitarian objection as tracking a ‘relational’ conception of 
equality’s value. On this view, very roughly, the value of equality is grounded in the value of 
living together as equals, in which none are treated as ‘above’ or ‘below’ any other, and where all 
can publically ‘look one another in the eye’ without shame or servility.53 But the specific form of 
hierarchy present in World B differs from typical relational egalitarian concerns with social 
equality in two important respects. First, relational equality is typically treated as separate from 
questions of distributive equality. By contrast, the form of hierarchy present in World B are 
inseparable from distributive concerns; the relational inequality that infects Word B supervenes on 
the allocation of property. Second, for relational egalitarians, the enemies of social equality are 
social facts. Social inequality it ultimately a matter of how people behave and the social norms 
																																																						
51 Waldron, The Right to Private Property, p.275. 
52 On the diversity of objections to inequality, see Thomas Scanlon, Why Does Inequality Matter? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018). 
53 See e.g. Elizabeth Anderson, ‘What’s the Point of Equality?’, Ethics 109, No.2 (1999): 287-337; Jonathan Wolff, 
‘Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 27, No. 2 (1998): 97-122; Samuel Scheffler, 
‘What Is Egalitarianism?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, No.1 (2003): 5-39; Martin O’Neill, (2008). What Should 
Egalitarians Believe? Philosophy & Public Affairs 36, No. 2 (2008): 119-156. The ‘eyeball test’ is from Philip Pettit, 
On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.84.  
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and expectations that shape their interactions.54 By contrast, the objectionable hierarchy present 
in World B is purely normative. What offends us about World is that the wills of the economically 
advantaged have a particular moral consequence: they non-causally influence the comparative 
moral protections from harm enjoyed by others. This objectionable feature does not inhere in 
any social interactions between members of World B, nor need it influence any such 
interactions.55 Hence, while the distinctive egalitarian complaint present in World B is relational 
in structure, it is also tightly connected to distributive concerns, as well as the ideal of basic 
equality (that all persons possess the same fundamental moral worth). 
 
With the unilateralism and inequality objections in hand, we are now in a position to explain how 
the scope of the means principle may itself inform and shape our rights to control parts of the 
world. As Quong himself puts it, “The scope of these rights is sensitive to the total costs these 
rights can impose on others.”56 What the unilateralism and inequality objections reveal is that the 
costs of an otherwise-identical allocation of property rights differ depending on whether a 
property-inclusive (World B) or property-exclusive (World A) version of the means principle is 
in operation. Given their differential costs of each system, we should expect that the justificatory 
conditions of each system will also differ. This difference in justificatory conditions ensures that 
there will be some distribution of property rights that is morally justified in World A but not in 
World B. 
 
How might the justificatory conditions differ between the two worlds? Here are two possibilities. 
First, it seems plausible that World B will be subject to additional constraints on property 
inequalities, given that an additional egalitarian complaint would apply in this world. There 
would be some level of property inequality which would not be morally legitimate in World B, 
but which would be legitimate in World A. Second, the two worlds may differ in terms of the 
content of property rights, rather than the legitimate distribution of property. More specifically, the 
justification of property rights in World B may require that property rights be weaker than those 
that would be justified in World A. Most obviously, the right to exclusive use might be more 
qualified in World B, in light of the fact that a less qualified right would give rise to the 
unilateralism and inequality objections outlined above. For example, it might require that the 
property owners do not have a right to exclusive use in circumstances that are structured like 
Three-Track Trolley, in which a stronger right to would most obviously give rise to the 
unilateralism and inequality objections. 
 
These are just two very brief suggestions, designed to illustrate how the application of a 
property-inclusive version of the means principle might impose additional constraints on an 
acceptable theory of property rights and distributive justice. To argue for the more general point, 
all that needs be shown is that it is plausible to think that a moral system governed by a property-
																																																						
54 On the role of norms in social hierarchies, see Han van Wietmarschen, ‘What is Social Hierarchy?’, Nous (2021) 
https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12387 
55 Though I speculate that in a community where this normative hierarchy were known, forms of social hierarchy 
would follow.  
 
56 Quong, MDF, p.185. 
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inclusive version of the means principle would be subject some additional objection(s) to some 
distributions of property rights, compared to a system governed by a property-exclusive version 
of the means principle.  
 
If this is correct, then this shows that the relationship between the morality of defensive force 
and distributive justice is more complex than Quong’s picture allows. We cannot simply plug-in 
an independent theory of distributive justice, which specifies our fair shares of control over the 
world, and then read-off an account of the scope of the means principle. Instead, the 
justification of our distributive entitlements is itself partly determined by the scope of the means 
principle. This demonstrates how, contra Quong, the principles of distributive justice and of 
permissible harm are not only parts of a single unified moral domain, but also mutually inform 
one another.  
 
Let me close with one final observation. Given the objections I have raised against a world 
governed by a property-inclusive means principle, one might think that I am assuming (contra 
Quong) that there is some fundamental moral difference between our bodily and property 
rights.57 Those objections inhere in the fact that property holdings are (i) partly a matter of the 
exercise of individuals’ wills and (ii) unequally distributed. These features are not present in the 
case of our bodies: we are all roughly equally embodied, and we have relatively little control over 
the extent of our ‘bodily holdings’. So those objections do not apply to a moral system in which 
the means principle is restricted to the use of our bodies.  
 
However, crucially, these differences between our bodies and property are contingent. It is 
possible to imagine a world in which a property-exclusive means principle would be subject to 
the same objections. Imagine, for example, a world in which persons have the ability to increase 
the size of their bodies and that doing so is beneficial in various ways, though typically not 
necessary to meet their basic needs (imagine that, like property, increasing the size of one’s body 
increases one’s opportunities and social prestige). Imagine, further, that these increasing the size 
of one’s body is costly, such that the rich have bodies that are many times larger than those of 
the poor. I contend that, in this hypothetical world, a moral system in which the means principle 
prohibited the harmful use of our bodies would be objectionable, compared to a world (like our 
own) in which our bodily holdings are insensitive to our wills and roughly equally distributed. In 
the former world, individuals would have an objectionable degree of control over others’ moral 
protections, which would be doubly objectionable if the ability to exercise this control tracks 
economic inequality. In light of these objections, the justification of this moral system may 
require making adjustments to our conception of bodily rights. These could include imposing 
limits on the extent of our bodily-ownership, or (most modestly) restricting the scope of the 
means principle such that it would no longer cover every harmful use of our bodies.58   
 
I believe this continuity between our bodies and our property provides additional support for the 
bi-directional view of the means principle and distributive justice that I have argued for. For it 
																																																						
57 Ibid., pp.195-196. 
58 For further discussion of the idea that our bodily rights would be very different if our bodies were very different, 
see Wenar, ‘Original Appropriation’ and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, ‘Against Self-Ownership: Why There Are No 
Fact-Insensitive Ownership Rights Over One’s Body’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 36, No.1 (2008): 86-118. 
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shows again that we cannot appeal to an entirely independent account of our rights over a 
certain part of the world in order to determine the scope of the constraint on harmful use. Even 
our rights over our bodies are partly informed by thinking about the implications of a moral 




59 My view here is continuous with (though does not depend upon) the more general position that our rights over 
our bodily resources are sensitive to the claims of others, in the same way that our property rights are so qualified. 
See e.g. Cecile Fabre, Whose Body is it Anyway: Justice and the Integrity of the Person? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006); Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
